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many suspect uses of racial classifications merely because the
government claims that the created programs serve an impor-
tant governmental interest.
Since gaining exclusive authority to license broadcast sta-
tions, the FCC has attempted to increase minority involvement
in the broadcast industry. Minorities owned only ten of the ap-
proximately 8,500 American radio and television stations in
1971; as of 1986, they owned only 2.1 percent of the country's
11,000 stations.5 Concluding that audience interests were
under-served by the lack of minority participation in the indus-
try,' the Commission promulgated new employment rules in
the hope that increased minority employment would promote
programming diversity.7
Although these rules initially enjoyed some success, the FCC
soon determined "that the views of racial minorities con-
tinue[d] to be inadequately represented" and decided that
"ownership ... is another significant way of fostering the inclu-
sion of minority views in... programming."18 The Commission
then developed two methods to increase minority ownership.
First, it revised its comparative hearing proceedings. When is-
suing a new license in a particular area, the Commission now
evaluates competing companies based on certain factors and
awards licenses through a weighted lottery system.' Aiming to
increase minority participation in the industry, the FCC added
minority ownership or involvement in station management to
the list of relevant factors considered in the comparative
hearings.
Second, the Commission enacted new measures to increase
the likelihood that licenses of existing stations would be trans-
ferred or reassigned to minorities. Previously, when an existing
license-holder's qualifications were questioned, a transfer or
assignment could not occur until the FCC held a hearing. 10
5. See id. at 3003.
6. See id. (citing MINORITY OWNERSHIP TASK FORCE, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMM'N, REPORT ON MINORITY OWNERSHIP IN BROADCASTING 1 (1978)).
7. See id. at 3003 & n.3.
8. Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcasting Facilities, 42 Rad. Reg. 2d (P
& F) 1689, 1691 (1978) [hereinafter Statement on Minority Ownership].
9. See Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3004-05. The six factors include: "diversifica-
tion of control of mass media communications, full-time participation in station opera-
tions by owners .... proposed program service, past broadcast record, efficient use of
the frequency, and the character of the applicants." Id.
10. See id at 3005.
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The Commission now gives station owners the option to avoid
a hearing by engaging in a "distress sale" to "an FCC-ap-
proved minority enterprise."' 1
In 1983, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. (Metro) and several other
companies applied for an FCC license to construct and operate
a new television station in Orlando, Florida.12 The Commission
initially awarded Metro the license because its primary compet-
itor, Rainbow Broadcasting (Rainbow), an Hispanic-owned
company, was disqualified. The FCC's review board reinstated
Rainbow's application, however, and after a comparative hear-
ing granted Rainbow the license because "Rainbow's minority
credit outweighed Metro's local residence and ciyic participa-
tion advantage." ' 13
Metro appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit. At the FCC Commissioner's re-
quest, the court of appeals remanded the case for further con-
sideration in light of an ongoing FCC investigation. into the
validity of minority preference policies. Before the study was
completed, however, Congress passed appropriations legisla-
tion prohibiting the use of appropriated FCC funds to evaluate
minority ownership policies. 4 The FCC curtailed its investiga-
tion and reaffirmed its grant of the license to Rainbow. Citing
circuit precedent and Congress's desire to increase minority
representation in the broadcasting industry, the court of ap-
peals affirmed Rainbow's license grant." .
In the other case considered in Metro Broadcasting,. Faith
Center, Inc. (Faith Center) twice sought FCC approval, in Feb-
ruary 1981 and again in September 1983, to transfer its Hart-
ford, Connecticut station's license in a distress sale. Both
11. Id. The three criteria necessary for a "distress sale" are: (1) Minority ownership
of the buyer must exceed 50 percent or be controlling; (2) the license must be
purchased before the start of the hearing; and (3) the price for the license must 'not
exceed 75 percent of fair market value. See id.
12. The facts of the consolidated cases are drawn from the Court's opinion in Metro
Broadcasting. See id at 3005-08.
13. Id. at 3005-06.
14. See Continuing Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-202,
101 Stat. 1329, 1329-31 (1987). The Act stated in pertinent part: "[N]one of the funds
appropriated by this Act shall be used to repeal, to retroactively apply changes in, or to
continue a reexamination of, the policies of the [FCC] with respect to comparative li-
censing [or] distress sales .... " Id.
15. See Winter Park Communications, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 873
F.2d 347, 353 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (quoting West Michigan Broadcasting Co. v. Federal
Communications Comm'n, 735 F.2d 601, 613 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S.
1027 (1985)), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 715 (1990).
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attempts, however, proved unsuccessful. Meanwhile, in Decem-
ber 1983, Shurberg Broadcasting of Hartford, Inc. (Shurberg)
applied for a license to construct a new television station in
Hartford. Shurberg sought a comparative hearing when Faith
Center, unable to transfer its license, filed for a license renewal.
In June 1984, Faith Center again requested approval for a dis-
tress sale-this time to Astroline Communications Company,
Limited Partnership (Astroline), another minority-owned appli-
cant. Although Shurberg claimed that the distress sale violated
its right to equal protection, the FCC permitted the license
transfer to Astroline. t6
Shurberg appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit, but the appeals court similarly
delayed deciding this case until the FCC completed its minority
preference study. When Congress prohibited further use of ap-
propriated funds for the investigation, the FCC reaffirmed the
distress sale. A divided court of appeals invalidated the distress
sale policy, however, holding that it unconstitutionally "denies
[Shurberg Broadcasting] equal protection under the due pro-
cess clause of the Fifth Amendment."' 17
By a five-to-four vote,'I the Supreme Court affirmed the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit's decision upholding the use of race
as a factor in comparative hearings and reversed the same
court's invalidation of the distress sale program. Writing for
the majority, Justice Brennan maintained that neither FCC pol-
icy violated notions of equal protection.
After discussing FCC efforts to increase programming diver-
sity through minority involvement in the broadcast industry,
the Court noted that "[i]t is of overriding significance in these
cases that the FCC's minority ownership programs have been
specifically approved-indeed, mandated-by Congress."' 19
This comment underscored the important role that deference
16. See Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3000.
17. Shurberg Broadcasting of Hartford, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n,
876 F.2d 902, 934 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The court found an equal protection violation
because "the program [was] not narrowly tailored to remedy past discrimination or to
promote programming diversity . d..." I
18. Justice Brennan filed the opinion ofthe Court, in whichJustices White, Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens joined. Justice Stevens delivered a brief concurring opinion.
Justice O'Connor filed a dissenting opinion, in which ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Jus-
tices Scalia and Kennedyjoined. Justice Kennedy; joined by Justice Scalia, filed a sepa-
rate dissent.
19. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3008.
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to Congress played in the opinion. Justice Brennan opined that
while evaluating racial classifications normally demands a high
level of scrutiny, Fullilove v. Klutznick 20 required that "a pro-
gram employing a benign racial classification ... adopted by an
administrative agency at the explicit direction of Congress" be
viewed "with appropriate deference. "21 More importantly, Jus-
tice Brennan noted that benign race-conscious programs may
be constitutionally acceptable even if they are not specifically
aimed at remedying the effects of past discrimination.2 2
Deeming the FCC minority ownership policies benign, the
Court applied a two-part test to determine whether the pro-
grams were constitutionally permissible.23 The Court first ex-
amined whether the race-conscious measures served important
governmental objectives. Although the Court recognized that
societal discrimination is primarily responsible for the lack of
minority involvement in broadcasting, it accepted the conclu-
sion of Congress and the Commission that programming diver-
sity is itself an important governmental objective because the
public has a "right to receive a diversity of views and informa-
tion over the airwaves." 24 Justice Brennan concluded that pref-
erence programs designed to augment minority ownership will
diversify the limited number of broadcasters on the airwaves,
just as "a diverse student body" will encourage "a robust ex-
change of ideas" 2 5-a constitutionally acceptable justification
for including race as a factor in university admissions decisions.
The second prong of the Court's test consisted of evaluating
whether the programs substantially relate to fulfilling the gov-
ernment's objective. The Court examined whether there is a
nexus between minority ownership and broadcast diversity.
Justice Brennan noted that both Congress and the Commission
20. 448 U.S. 448 (1980). In Fullilove, the Court rejected a challenge to the minority
business enterprise (MBE) provision of the Public Works Employment Act of 1977.
The Act dictated that at least 10 percent of federal funds for local public works projects
be set aside to acquire services or supplies from MBEs, unless an administrative waiver
is granted. Congress justified this provision with a finding of past discrimination in the
construction industry nationwide.
21. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3008 (quoting Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 472 (plurality
opinion)).
22. See id. at 3008-09.
23. The test that the Court applied was the same one advocated by Justices Brennan,
White, Marshall, and Blackmun in their opinion in University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 359 (1978) (opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.,
concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
24. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3010.
25. ld. (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-13 (Powell, J.)).
No. 1] 263
Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy
had found a correlation between the two, 26 and that such a
finding should be accorded "great weight."' 27 To avoid the ap-
pearance of simply deferring to the dictates of Congress and
the FCC, however, Justice Brennan recounted the numerous
acts and reports that had concluded that minority ownership
polices were necessary to achieve broadcast diversity. 28
The Court worried that the finding of such a relationship
would be perceived as based on stereotyping.29 To dispel such
notions, Justice Brennan noted that "[c]ongressional policy
does not assume that in every case minority ownership and
management will lead to minority-oriented programming or to
... a discrete 'minority viewpoint' ... ."I Instead, he said, the
programs will lead to diversity "in the aggregate."'" He but-
tressed this conclusion by citing various studies and the Court's
reasoning in Bakke.32
The final section of the Court's opinion served two purposes:
to show that the FCC had rejected more extreme actions to
achieve programming diversity and to prove that the methods
chosen would not unduly burden non-minorities. The Court
noted that although the Commission had concluded that race-
neutral methods such as equal employment rules were unsuc-
cessful, it was unwilling to invoke more extreme policies such
as set-asides. 33 Justice Brennan also insisted that consideration
of race as a factor is fair to minorities and non-minorities alike
for two reasons. First, companies competing for licenses
through the lottery system have no guarantee of receiving one;
thus, no legitimate expectations have been dashed."4 Second,
the FCC has a responsibility to license in the "public interest,
convenience, or necessity," and because there are a limited
number of electromagnetic frequencies, "[n]o one has a First
Amendment right to license."'3 5 Thus, the FCC was fulfilling its
26. See id. at 3011.
27. Id (quoting Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412
U.S. 94, 102 (1973)).
28. See id. at 3011-16. See, e.g., Statement on Minority Ownership, supra note 8, at 1692-
93.
29. See Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3016.
30. Id
31. Id
32. See id at 3017-18 & n.33.
33. See id. at 3022-23.
34. See id. at 3026.
35. Id. (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Federal Communications
Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367, 389 (1969)).
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mission to support the "public interest."
In a brief concurring opinion, Justice Stevens emphasized
that affirmative action policies should not aim to remedy past
wrongs, but instead should "focus on future benefit." 6 He
stressed, however, that racial distinctions should rarely be
used, and then only for "clearly identified and unquestionably
legitimate"'" purposes.
Justice O'Connor dissented, recalling that last Term the
Court required that a strict-scrutiny test be applied when evalu-
ating racial classifications.38 In contrast to the majority view,
she argued that the congressional actions involved in Metro
Broadcasting should be judged with this same level of review.3 9
Justice O'Connor warned that by failing to strike down the
FCC's policies, the Court was "[endorsing] race-based reason-
ing and the conception of a Nation divided into racial blocs,
thus contributing to an escalation of racial hostility and
conflict." 40
A significant portion of Justice O'Connor's dissent attacked
the Court's reliance on Fullilove to justify "benign" race-con-
scious policies. First, she pointed out that Congress's remedial
powers under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment were
central to the decision in Fullilove;41 they were not at issue in
Metro Broadcasting.42 Second, Fullilove insisted "that careful re-
view was essential to ensure that Congress acted solely for re-
medial rather than other, illegitimate purposes."4 Broadcast
diversity, she noted, is obviously a forward-looking, not reme-
dial, purpose. Finally, in Fullilove the Court had already re-
jected the intermediate-scrutiny approach adopted by the
Court in Metro Broadcasting.44
After rejecting the Court's approach, Justice O'Connor ana-
36. Id. at 3028 (Stevens, J., concurring).
37. Id (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 535 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).
38. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
39. See Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3030 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 3029 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
41. See id. at 3031 (O'ConnorJ, dissenting). Section Five of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment provides that "[t]he Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legisla-
tion, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
42. See Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3030-31 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Section
5 empowers Congress to act respecting the States, and of course this case concerns
only the administration of federal programs by federal officials.").
43. Id. at 3031 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 486-87 (plurality
opinion).
44. See Metro Broadcastng, 110 S. Ct. at 3032 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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lyzed the case using a strict-scrutiny test. She found that the
FCC programs failed to satisfy the test's first prong-that there
be a compelling government interest-because "[m]odern
equal protection doctrine [recognizes] only one such interest:
remedying the effects of racial discrimination."45 Broadcast di-
versity did not qualify as a compelling interest because she
viewed the concept as "too amorphous, [and] too insubstan-
tial."' 46 Compelling interests must be "specific and verifia-
ble,"'47 according to Justice O'Connor, and cannot be based on
generalized notions of remedying societal discrimination. 48
Justice O'Connor determined that the FCC policies also did
not satisfy the test's second prong because they were not nar-
rowly tailored to achieve the governmental interest. The FCC's
programs are premised on the notion that different racial
groups possess distinct viewpoints. 49 These policies do not
guarantee that a license grant to a minority firm would increase
the expression of minority viewpoints, however, because many
factors, such as market forces, affect programming decisions.50
Moreover, she noted that in Bakke, the Court rejected the sup-
position that there are distinct racial viewpoints. 5 Finally, Jus-
tice O'Connor indicated that race-neutral approaches exist that
would more effectively further the FCC's goal of programming
diversity.5 2
In a scathing dissent, Justice Kennedy compared the Court's
reasoning in Metro Broadcasting to the rationale used in Plessy v.
Ferguson 53 and a quotation from a publication of the South Afri-
can government. 54 With these analogies he sought to demon-
45. Id. at 3034 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
46. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
47. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
48. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 505; see also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,
276 (1986) (plurality opinion). In HWgant, the Court held unconstitutional the layoff
provision of a collective-bargaining agreement between the teachers' union and the
board of education. Under the layoff provision, teachers with the most seniority would
be retained, except that the percentage of minority teachers laid off could not exceed
the percentage of minority teachers employed at the time of the layoff. In so holding,
the Court rejected the theory that the minority teachers were needed as role models to
remedy past societal discrimination.
49. See Metro Broadcasting, I10 S. Ct. at 3037 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
50. See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
51. Sie University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 310-11 (1978) (Powell,J.).
52. See Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3039 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
53. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
54. "The policy is not based on any concept of superiority or inferiority, but merely
on the fact that people differ, particularly in their group associations, loyalties, cultures,
outlook, modes of life and standards of development." Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at
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strate how policies that are justified as benign invariably harm
someone.55 He concluded by observing that the Court has
shifted from endorsing Plessy's "separate but equal" standard
to Metro Broadcasting's "unequal but benign."56
The Court's holding in Metro Broadcasting has placed affirma-
tive action jurisprudence in conflict. Had the Court followed
the precedent of Croson, it would have applied a routine strict-
scrutiny analysis and struck down the FCC programs. Instead,
by employing an intermediate-scrutiny test because the pro-
grams were deemed "benign," a term the Court never both-
ered to define, the outcome of future cases seems likely to be
determined by the personal opinion of the judge hearing the
case as to whether the program in question is invidious or be-
nign. In other words, the fate of affirmative action programs
may now turn on the personal whims of judges.
Applying a strict-scrutiny test to racial preference programs
requires that some minimal level of objectivity be maintained in
a court's decision. As Justice O'Connor noted, only remedying
the effects of past racial discrimination would serve as an ade-
quate compelling interest to satisfy the first prong of a strict-
scrutiny analysis." Speaking for the Court in Croson, she recog-
nized that "the purpose of strict-scrutiny is to 'smoke out' ille-
gitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative body is
pursuing a goal important enough to warrant the use of a
highly suspect tool." s5 8 Thus, a court must first make an objec-
tive determination of whether a minority preference program
was designed to remedy specific past discrimination. Then, it
can analyze whether the program is narrowly tailored to
achieve that goal.
To the extent that a finding of specific past discrimination is
no longer required under Metro Broadcasting, courts will be
asked to judge a program in the context of generalized, societal
discrimination. The Supreme Court itself, however, has re-
jected this approach on numerous occasions for two persuasive
3046 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting SoUTH AFRICA AND THE RULE OF LAW 37
(1968)).
55. See id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 3047 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
57. See id. at 3034 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
58. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
No. 1) 267
Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy
reasons.59 First, as Justice Powell commented in Bakke, societal
discrimination is "an amorphous concept of injury that may be
ageless in its reach into the past."' It simply would justify too
many suspect uses of race classifications. Similarly, in Croson,
the Court concluded that a claim of ,societal discrimination
"provides no guidance for a legislative body to determine the
precise scope of the injury it seeks to remedy. It 'has no logical
stopping point.' "61
The second and related reason for rejecting a societal
discrimination justification is that its use will increase the need
for racial classifications. Benign race-conscious measures ne-
cessitate dividing people into racial blocs: victim blocs and op-
pressor blocs. When remedying identified, particular
discrimination, the beneficiary of such a policy can point to the
specific wrong to highlight the obstacles to his achievement.
The beneficiary of a program based on societal discrimination,
however, cannot do the same. Instead, the program will "only
reinforce common stereotypes holding that certain groups are
unable to achieve success without special protection based on a
factor having no relationship to individual worth."62
The Court in Metro Broadcasting attempted to avoid the socie-
tal discrimination dilemma by labelling the programs "benign"
and by noting that Congress had created them. Thus, the Court
asserted that only intermediate scrutiny need be applied when
evaluating the FCC measures. In failing to define what consti-
tutes "benign race-consciousness," however, the Court has left
no guidelines for lower courts to follow in determining what is
a legitimate race-based decision. For example, suppose a
school district, alarmed by the high attrition rate and the low
sense of self-esteem of its black male students, decides to cre-
ate special schools for these youths to combat these
problems.6" A judge may conclude that under the intermedi-
59. See id. at 498-506; Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274-76 (plurality opinion); Bakke, 438 U.S.
at 307-10 (Powell, J.).
60. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307 (Powell, J.).
61. Croson, 488 U.S. at 498 (quoting Wygant, 476 U.S. at 275 (plurality opinion)).
62. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298 (Powell, J.).
63. See Schools Segregate Black Male Pupils, Wash. Times, Oct. 19, 1990, at Al, col. 5.
Milwaukee has established separate facilities for black male students, although the
schools will be open to all students. Chicago has a program that takes black boys in the
fourth-through-eighth grades out of their classrooms two or three times a week. In
Baltimore, three elementary schools have separate classes for black males. New York
City is considering establishing separate schools for black boys. See Jordan, Segregation
Won't Work, N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1990, § 4, at 19, col. 5.
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ate-scrutiny standard of Metro Broadcasting, the program is valid
because the district's benign and sincere approach supports an
important governmental interest and is substantially related to
the achievement of that interest. If the school district never
stated its reason for establishing the separate schools, though,
would intermediate or strict scrutiny be applied?' Such diffi-
culties could arise for all sorts of programs, regardless of
whether such programs were created by Congress or by a local
governmental unit.
In addition, the Court's reliance on Fullilove to support the
application of intermediate scrutiny in this case is misplaced.
Fullilove stands for the proposition that when Congress identi-
fies specific discrimination within an industry, Congress can ex-
ercise its "unique remedial powers . . . under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment."6 Unlike the discrimination identi-
fied in the construction industry in Fullilove, Congress found no
specific discrimination in the broadcast industry. Because Con-
gress here merely seeks to enhance programming diversity and
not to remedy particular discrimination, the Court cannot in-
voke Fullilove to justify the FCC policies.
The Court analogized the FCC's goal of broadcast diversity
to the classroom diversity it sought to attain in Bakke. This anal-
ogy seems premised on the belief that there are a limited
number of broadcast frequencies, just as there are a limited
number of admissions slots. This comparison fails for two rea-
sons, however. First, Justice Powell explicitly stated in Bakke
that "[p]referring members of any one group for no reason
other than race or ethnic origin is discrimination for its own
sake."66 Instead, the uniqueness of the academic environment
and academic freedom associated with it permits a "university
to make its own judgments as to education includ[ing] the se-
lection of its student body."6 7 Second, advances in technology
have removed most practical limitations on the number of
broadcast frequencies.68 Thus, the Court has no real justifica-
64. How should a judge evaluate a program that has a benign stated purpose that
may actually benefit the minority group, but in fact was created for an invidious reason?
65. Croson, 488 U.S. at 488.
66. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307 (Powell, J.).
67. Id at 312 (Powell, J.).
68. The Court's adherence to the view that there are a limited number of broadcast
frequencies follows the approach of such cases as Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal
Communications Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). Because the Court has attached im-
portance to this limitation, the broadcast industry has been treated differently than
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